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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
These proposed rules would undoubtedly aid in the resolution
of the confusion that exists under today's rules relating to discovery
of the attorney's "work product" and perhaps end the influx of
numerous discovery cases into the district courts.
M
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAx HoME CONCEPT
Section 63(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 defines
taxable income as gross income minus certain -deductions. Among
these deductions are listed all ordinary and necessary traveling ex-
penses incurred while away from home in pursuit of a trade or
business." Whereas "away from home" seems a simple enough
concept for even the layman to comprehend, it has caused a ple-
thora of problems for the courts and for the Internal Revenue
Service. Cases have developed in two separate areas of the law
in order to arrive at a practical definition of "away from home."
One line of cases has sought a meaning for the term "home" and
thus has developed the "tax home" concept.2  The second line of
cases has focused on what "away" means as used in its statutory
context.
In order to understand the present situation in this area and
the direction in which the law is moving, it is necessary to develop
each of these two areas separately. It seems plausible to begin
with the term "home" and the way in which Congress, the courts
and the Internal Revenue Service have construed it. Special em-
phasis in this area will be given to Commissioner v. Stidger,3 the
most recent Supreme Court pronouncement concerning the "tax
home" doctrine. Then, with at least a workable understanding of
the "tax home" concept, the discussion will proceed to the related
problem of how "away" is to be interpreted under the statute.
Tax Home
A deduction for travel expenses, including all expenditures for
meals and lodging, was first included in Section 214(a) of the
Revenue Act of 1921.4 Previously, Treasury Regulations promul-
I INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (2).
2See Note, A Renewed Assault on the Tax Home Doctrine, 20 Sw.
L.J. 676 (1966).3386 U.S. 287 (1967).
4 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 214(a) (1), 42 Stat. 227.
That in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(1) . . . traveling expenses (including the entire amount ex-
pended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit
of a trade or business.
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gated in 1920 had permitted a deduction of only the amount by
which the cost of meals and lodging incurred while away from
home exceeded the cost at home.5 However, under earlier regu-
lations none of this expense had been deductible.-
Transcripts of congressional debate indicate that Congress en-
acted the travel expense provision primarily for the benefit of
traveling salesmen.7 It was designed to enable commercial travel-
ers who were employed on a commission basis to compete with
salaried employees by permitting a deduction for their traveling
expenses. Thus, it was to be an encouragement to private enter-
prise.8
The Revenue Act required the presence of three factors before
permitting a travel expense deduction. The expense was required
to be: (1) reasonable and necessary; (2) incurred while "away
from home"; and, (3) in the pursuit of a trade or business.9 These
provisions have been reenacted in the 1939 and 1954 Revenue
Codes.'
Although home is ordinarily considered synonymous with resi-
dence and dwelling place, and no mention was made by Congress
that it was to be used as a word of art, soon after section 214(a)
was enacted, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought to limit
its scope by defining "home" as the taxpayer's principal place of
business." In 1927, the Board of Tax Appeals"' incorporated the
Commissioner's definition into law when it stated, in Mort L.
Bixler,"3
traveling and living expenses are deductible under the provisions of .
section [214(a) (1)] only while the taxpayer is away from his place of
business, employment, or the post or station at which he is employed,
in the prosecution, conduct, and carrying on of a trade or business.' 4
What appears to have motivated the adoption of this unusual defi-
nition of home was the fear that under a less restrictive interpreta-
tion an individual could choose to maintain his residence at a
location far removed from his place of employment, and then de-
T.D. 3101, 3 Cum. BuLL. 191 (1920). Under earlier regulations none
of this expense was deductible. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 292 (1920).
621 TR, As. DEc. Ixr. REv. 241 (1919).
7 61 CONG. REC. 6673 (1921) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
861 CONG. REc. 5201 (1921) (remarks of Representative Hawley).
9 Flowers v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
0 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a) (1), 53 Stat. 12; INr. REv.
CoDE oF 1954, § 162(a) (2). The section appears in substantially the same
form as in the 1921 code.
11 O.D. 1021, 5 Cum. BuL.. 174 (1921).
12The Board of Tax Appeals (B.T.A.) was established in 1924, re-
organized in 1926, and in 1942 was renamed the Tax Court (T.C.).
3 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927).
24 Id. at 1184.
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duct his traveling expenses from his net income, thereby forcing
the government to bear part of the burden of expenses incurred
solely for the taxpayer's convenience. 15 By its interpretation of
the word "home," the Board of Tax Appeals in Bixier created
what has since been referred to as the "tax home" doctrine.16
It was soon realized that a strict interpretation of the "tax
home" doctrine would severely curtail the travel expense deduction
and an exception to the doctrine was declared, allowing a deduction
where the taxpayer's employment away from his residence was of
a temporary nature.'7 However, where the employee had no knowl-
edge of the duration of his employment, even where it was im-
practical or impossible to move his family to his new job site, the
employment was termed "indefinite" and no deduction was per-
mitted.' 8 This exception was based on a realization that a tax-
payer could not reasonably be expected to change his residence
where his employment away from his residence would be of a
short duration.'9 An example of the way this "temporary" v. "in-
definite" rule was applied is James R. Whitaker 20 in which
petitioner deducted amounts expended for meals and lodging while
working as a project engineer for a construction project in Green-
land. His family resided in Indiana, and petitioner claimed that
his principal place of business was in New York. He did not dis-
pute the "tax home" interpretation. The Tax Court held that,
although petitioner's family was not permitted to accompany him
and the construction work had actually lasted less than one year,
his employment was "indefinite" and the expenses incurred were
personal living expenses and not business expenses.
Notwithstanding the general acceptance of this exception to
the Commissioner's "tax home" concept, there has been considerable
disagreement in the federal courts regarding the "tax home" doc-
trine itself. While most of the federal circuit courts have accepted
15 In Bixler, the maintenance of petitioner's home in a certain location
was purely voluntary. While some of the expenses in question were incurred
while petitioner was employed, the rest arose while he was in the process
of seeking new employment.
See Note, A Renewed Assaudt on the Tax Home Doctrine, 20 Sw.
L.J. 676 (1966).
3.7.g., Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F2d 763 (2d Cir. 1943); Chester
D. Griesemer, 10 B.T.A. 386 (1928).
'SJames R. Whitaker, 24 T.C. 750 (1955).
'9 Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1960).
2024 T.C. 750 (1955).
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the Commissioner's definition of "home" for tax purposes,21 the
fifth, 22 sixth,23 and ninth24 circuits have not.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first demonstrated
its opposition to the Commissioner's definition of "home" for tax
purposes in 1944. In Wallace v. Commissioner,25 an actress, who
had been living in New York and had leased an apartment there
for three years, was engaged in the filming of a movie in Holly-
wood, California. Before filming had commenced, petitioner mar-
ried a lawyer in whose house in San Francisco she took up resi-
dence upon completion of the film. She deducted from her income
tax all expenses paid for meals and lodging while in Hollywood.
It was the court's opinion that the definition given by the Tax
Court to the term "home" (as the taxpayer's principal place of
business), would thwart Congress' purpose of taxing net, rather
than gross, income since it had the effect of denying the taxpayer
a proper deduction. It was reasoned that commonly-used terms
such as "home" should not be distorted by judicial or administrative
interpretation.2  Therefore, petitioner's "home" was held to be in
New York prior to her marriage and thereafter became San Fran-
cisco, and such an interpretation enabled her to deduct all expenses
incurred while in Hollywood.
The Supreme Court of the United States, on two occasions,
had the opportunity to define the word "home" as it relates to the
travel deduction section of the Internal Revenue Code. On both
occasions it has chosen not to do so. Commissioner v. Flowers,27
decided in 1946, concerned a taxpayer who had resided with his
family in Mississippi since 1903. In 1939, petitioner was made
vice-president of a railroad company which had its main office in
Alabama. An arrangement was made with the company by which the
taxpayer would continue to reside in Mississippi but would pay
his own transportation expenses, including meals and lodging, on
trips between the two states. The fifth circuit had permitted the
taxpayer's deduction of expenditures while in Alabama under
Section 23(a) (1) (A) of the Revenue Act of 1939, seeing no reason
for giving the word "home" a meaning other than that of common
usage.28  The court reasoned that such action would be an invasion
2 1 See, e.g., England v. United States, 345 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 3S2 U.S. 936 (1965); Cockrell v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 504(8th Cir. 1963); O'Toole v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1957);
Andrews v. Commissioner, 179 F2d 502 (4th Cir. 1950); York v. Com-
missioner, 160 F2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1947).22 United States v. LeBlanc, 278 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1960).23 BuMs v. Gray, 287 F2d 698 (6th Cir. 1961).
24 Wright v. Hartsell, 305 F2d 221 (9th Cir. 1962).
25 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944).
20Id. at 411.
27326 U.S. 465 (1946).28 Flowers v. Commissioner, 148 F2d 163 (5th Cir. 1945).
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of the legislative domain. The United States Supreme Court
found it unnecessary to define the term "home." The deduction
was disallowed on the ground that it did not satisfy the third
criterion established by the statute, i.e., the expense was not in-
curred while in pursuit of the taxpayer's business. The Court de-
clared that in order for the taxpayer to be entitled to a deduction,
"the exigencies of business rather than the personal conveniences
and necessities of the traveler must be the motivating factors. '29
In 1958, the Supreme Court was once again confronted with
the "tax home" issue in Peurifoy v. Commissioner." The Court
affirmed the circuit court's judgment3' that construction workers
employed away from their permanent residences for periods of
eight to twenty months 32 were away from home "temporarily" and
not "indefinitely." The majority considered the lower court's
factual determination to have been based on reasonable grounds
and therefore found no reason for intervening. Once again no
mention was made of how "home" was to be construed.
In 1967, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict between the fourth33 and ninth circuits34 involving the "tax
home" issue. In Commissioner v. Stidger,35 respondent, a Marine
officer, was transferred from California, where he and his family
resided, to a base in Japan for a standard fifteen-month tour of
duty. Because a Marine Corps directive prohibited servicemen
from taking their families abroad, respondent was forced to maintain
his residence in California. Subsequently, in filing his 1958 income
tax return, he deducted as "away from home" travel expenses the
total cost of meals incurred during his overseas assignment. The
United States Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, disallowed respondent's deduction and held that
a military taxpayer is not "away from home" while at a permanent
overseas duty station, regardless of whether it is feasible or per-
missible for his family to reside with him.
At the outset, the Court reiterated the three conditions which
must be met before a travel expense deduction will be allowed.
The Court found that two of these conditions were clearly satisfied.
The expenditures were "ordinary and necessary" and there was a
direct connection between the expense and the trade or business
of the taxpayer. The only remaining question was whether the
29 Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 474 (1946).
30358 U.S. 59 (1958).
31254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957).
32See 44 CORNELL L.Q. 270 (1959), where it is maintained that prior
to Peurifoy a period of one year was used by the courts to distinguish
between "temporary" and "indefinite."
33 Bercaw v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1948).
34 Stidger v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1965).
35 386 U.S. 287 (1967).
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taxpayer was "away from home," within the meaning of section
162(a) (2), while stationed in Japan.
The Commissioner contended that Congress had tacitly con-
firmed his definition of "home" as the taxpayer's principal place of
business. It was noted that, in 1936, the Board of Tax Appeals
ruled that a Member of Congress, who is by law required to main-
tain a residence in the state or district which he represents, could
not deduct his expenses incurred while in Washington, D.C. 6
Rather than change the statute to provide that "home" was to be
synonymous with residence for all taxpayers, Congress carved an
exception to cover the traveling problems inherent in serving as a
national legislator.3 7 The Commissioner also claimed that Congress
had given its approval to his interpretation by re-enacting the
phrase "away from home" in subsequent revisions of the 1921
Code.38
However, the majority of the Court felt it unnecessary to
decide whether Congress had tacitly given its approval to the
manner in which "home" had been construed by the Commissioner.
Rather, the Court chose to base its determination on the unique
situation of a military taxpayer. The essential difference is that
the Career Compensation Act of 1949 31 provides for tax-free al-
lowances for subsistence, 40 quarters 41 and additional travel and trans-
portation allowances when the serviceman is away from his perma-
nent station.4 2 These allowances have been adjusted as the financial
burdens of the serviceman have increased.43 Thus, a deprivation
of the travel expense deduction does not fall as heavily on the
military taxpayer as it does on his civilian counterpart.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has taken the position,
since 1955, that no deductions for meals and lodging would be al-
lowed to military taxpayers regardless of whether their families
3GLindsay v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936).
37 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) :
For purposes of the preceding sentence, the place of residence of a
Member of Congress . . . within the State, congressional district,
Territory, or possession which he represents in Congress shall be
considered his home, but amounts expended by such Members within
each taxable year for living expenses shall not be deductible for
income tax purposes in excess of $3000.
33 In Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939),
dealing with another section of the Code, it was decided that re-enactment
was a sign of congressional approval and gave the administrative construction
the force of law. Accord, Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 511
(1959). Bul see Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 93 (1959); Com-
missioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
39 Career Compensation Act of 1949, ch. 681, 63 Stat. 802.
4037 U.S.C. §402 (1964).
4137 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
42 37 U.S.C. § 404 (1964).4 3 See, e.g., H.R. REp. No. 779, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1949).
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were permitted to accompany them on an overseas assignment."
For military purposes the serviceman's home is considered to be
his permanent post of duty. The Court recognized, however, that
no parallel can be drawn between military life, with its frequent
changes of location, and the permanence of location realized in
civilian life. If the allowances were insufficient, the remedy lay
with Congress and not the courts. In fact, in 1963, Congress di-
rected itself to the problems of the instant case, i.e., the separation
of families and consequently the maintenance of two homes, and
granted a flat sum allotment to the dependents involved.4 5 These
factors led the Court to agree with the Commissioner in labeling a
military taxpayer's "home" his permanent duty station irrespective
of whether it is feasible or even possible for him to have his
family reside with him.
The dissenting justices reiterated the argument that "home" is
where the taxpayer and his family actually reside and no strained
meaning should be incorporated into the statute.46 Although they
recognized the complex factual issues which the Commissioner
would have to consider if the rule for the travel deduction were not a
rigid one, it was felt that the tax laws are sufficiently discriminatory,
due mainly to the strengths of various pressure groups, without
adding to their harshness. However, should a taxpayer decide to
reside a great distance from his place of employment, the dissent
agreed with the ninth circuit that he would be prevented from de-
ducting his expenditures as travel expenses; they would not be
"ordinary and necessary" since not dictated by business needs. It
was further reasoned that, although certain allowances were made
to Stidger,47 the same allowances were given whether he was sta-
tioned in the Far East or in the United States. "There was no
increase to help defray the increased expenses incurred by him
while required to live away from his family.
48
The position taken by the Supreme Court in Stidger, although
definitive, is a limited one. Henceforth, for tax purposes, a military
taxpayer's "home" is his permanent duty station. Whether it is
feasible or even possible for the serviceman's family to accompany
him abroad is irrelevant. However, the fact that the military
taxpayer is atypical of most taxpayers has allowed the Supreme
Court to refrain from clear-cut acceptance of the "tax home" doc-
trine. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the Com-
-Rev. Rul. 55-571, 1955-22 Cum. BuLL. 44.
4537 U.S.C. §427(b) (1964). See H.R. REP. No. 208, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1963).
46Stidger v. Commissioner, 386 U.S. 287, 297 (1967) (dissenting
opinion).
4 Stidger received a tax-free quarters allowance of $102.50 per month,
and a tax-free subsistence allowance of $42.50 per month.
48 386 U.S. at 297 (dissenting opinion).
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missioner's interpretation of "home" was to be adopted "in all of
its myriad applications since, in the context of the military tax-
payer, the Commissioner's position has a firmer foundation. 4 9
That decision must be held in abeyance by the Court until the
proper case is presented to it or until Congress gives an indication
of its attitude toward this predicament. Consequently, the Court's
decision in Stidger will have a substantial impact on only the tax-
payers in the Armed Services. No certain predictions can be made
as to the outcome of a similar case not involving the peculiarities
of a military taxpayer's situation because the majority of the Court
has not expressed itself on the point.
Away from Home -Away from Home Over-night
Assuming any definition of "home" we arrive at the second
problematic area, that of discovering when a taxpayer is considered
"away from home" for tax purposes. In this area as well, the
Internal Revenue Service has adopted a viewpoint which would not
be evident by a mere reading of the statute in question." °
The position of the Service is that before a taxpayer can deduct the
cost of his meals and lodging as "away from home" expenses, his ab-
sence on business from his principal or regular post of duty must be
"overnight." Such absence need not be for an entire twenty-four hour
day or throughout the hours from dusk until dawn, but it must be of
such duration or nature that the taxpayer cannot leave from and return
to that location at the start and finish of, or before and after, each
day's work; or at least that he cannot reasonably be expected to do so
without being released from duty for sufficient time to obtain substan-
tial sleep or rest elsewhere.5"
Thus the Service has chosen to regard "away from home" as mean-
ing "away from home overnight."
In support of its view, the Service refers to the Congressional
Reports published prior to the adoption of the 1954 Internal Rev-
enue Code.r2 The House Report, as a preface to its recommenda-
tion concerning Section 62 (2) (c) of the Code, stated that business
transportation expenses were only deductible by an employee where
they are reimbursed by the employer or where they are incurred
while the employee is away from home overnight. 3  The recom-
49 Id. at 292.
5'S'ee Int. Rev. Serv., U.S. Dep't of Treasury Pub. No. 300, Deduction
for Traveling and Transportation Expenses (1956), reprinted in 5 CCH
1956 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 6347.
51 Rev. Rul. 239, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 87.
52 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4033, 4638 (1954).
53 For a discussion of the weight to be placed upon the mere mentioning
of the "overnight" concept by Congress see William A. Bagley, 46 T.C.
176 (1966).
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mendation made by the committee and adopted in the 1954 Code5
enabled employees to deduct business transportation expenses with-
out the necessity of incurring them while away from home. How-
ever, commuter expenses were not included in this deduction and
"transportation" expenses were viewed as a much narrower con-
cept than "travel" expenses, the latter including costs for meals and
lodging. Consequently, difficulty in this area was limited by the
above section because where an employee traveled and returned
home within one day he was now permitted a deduction for any
transportation cost incurred, whereas if the taxpayer took lodging
for the night he was permitted the deduction under the old provi-
sions. Therefore, the only cost of any consequence to the em-
ployee which was not tax deductible was the cost of meals on a
trip where lodging proved unnecessary. A second argument made
by the Internal Revenue Service in support of the "away from
home overnight" concept was that meals and lodging are included
in section 162 (a) (2) in such a way that they must occur together
in order to be entitled to a deduction.5 5 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit56 has noted that the "travel expense"
section as it appears in section 62(2) (b) does not reveal the in-
terpretation offered by the Service.
As with the "tax home" doctrine, the courts have not demon-
strated uniformity in the "overnight" area. In Kenneth Waters,
5 7
the Tax Court allowed petitioner a deduction for expenses incurred
while driving his automobile on business trips. The court declared
that travel while away from home should be regarded in its "plain,
ordinary and popular sense."5' 8  The court did not feel that there
was any "overnight" connotation inherent in the statute or that
Congress had intended any such connotation. In an oft-quoted
passage, the Tax Court argued:
Surely it would be absurd to say that an employee who flew from
Boston to Washington on business and returns to Boston the same day
is not entitled to the deduction, but that if he takes two days for the
whole trip, he is entitled to the deduction.5
It must be noted here that the Waters court stated clearly that it was
dealing with transportation expenses, not travel expenses.60
5 4 INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, §62(1) (c).
55 Hanson v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 413, 417 (1960).56Hanson v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 1962).
57 12 T.C. 414 (1949).58 Helvering v. Rebsamen Motors, Inc., 128 F.2d 584 (8th Cir. 1942).
59Kenneth Waters, 12 T.C. 414, 417 (1949).
60 Waters was a 1949 case. Because of it and other similar cases
such as Joseph M. Winn, 32 T.C. 220 (1959), § 62(2) (b) of the 1954 Code
was adopted, permitting deductions for this type of expense.
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In Fred Marion Osteen,61 petitioner, a railway postal clerk,
left his home railway station at 8:00 p.m. and arrived at his des-
tination at 10:40 p.m. He ate his third meal of the day there
before returning home at 2:15 a.m. The Tax Court decided not
to allow him a deduction for this meal (incurred on a regular
basis) because his work, in spite of being at night, was actually
shorter than a regular working day and could be distinguished from
Waters because the meal was clearly a personal expense and could
not be classified as a business cost.
Both the fifth 62 and eighth circuits,- have asserted their
denial of the Service's "overnight" doctrine. In Williams v.
Patterson,"4 a railroad conducter brought an action to recover in-
come taxes paid. Petitioner arose each morning at 5:00 a.m., left
the railroad station in Alabama aboard his train at 7:40 a.m. and
arrived in Atlanta, Georgia, at 12:15 p.m. He then took six hours
off before returning to duty for a 6:15 p.m. departure. During the
six hour break petitioner rented a room in a hotel, in which he
rested and ate two meals, all of which expenses he attempted to
deduct from his income tax return. The fifth circuit allowed him
the deduction, declaring that the rest was necessary for the petitioner
in order to insure the public's safety for which, as a railroad con-
ductor, he was responsible. The court stated the correct rule to be:
If the nature of the taxpayer's employment is such that when away
from home, during released time, it is reasonable for him to need and
obtain sleep or rest in order to meet the exigencies of his employment,
or the business demands of his employment, his expenditures (includ-
ing incidental expenses, such as tips) for the purpose of obtaining
sleep and rest are deductible traveling expenses under Section 162(a) (2)
of the 1954 Revenue Code. 5
In Hanson v. Commissioner," petitioner, a construction con-
tractor and sole executive of his corporation, had his home office
in one city in Iowa but maintained close contact with construction
jobs scattered throughout the state. While on occasion he would
stay overnight at the job site he frequently would, due to the
exigencies of business rather that personal convenience, return to
his home at night. Petitioner attempted to deduct the cost of
meals incurred on these latter trips. The court alluded to several
alternative methods for determining when a taxpayer was "away"
from home,67 yet it did not adopt any of these approaches. Al-
01 14 T.C. 1261 (1950).
02 Williams v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
03 Hanson v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
04 286 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961).
65 Id. at 340.
06 298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
67 Id. at 395 n.3.
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though finding the Commissioner's "overnight" rule arbitrary and
consequently granting petitioner's deductions, the court arrived at
the rather unsatisfactory conclusion that each case must be decided
on its own facts.
Because of the Hanson decision, the Internal Revenue Service
reiterated its previous "overnight" approach and explicitly attacked
the eighth circuit's judgment."" However, the Tax Court, as ex-
emplified by William A. Bagley,"9 has chosen to adhere to the
Hanson conclusion rather than exhibit accordance with the Serv-
ice's views. The majority opinion disputed the 1963 Revenue Rul-
ing's interpretation as to the importance of the congressional refer-
ence to the "overnight" rule on the ground that the House Com-
mittee's recommendation did not even deal with the "away from
home" expense section.70 However, in a concurring opinion, it
was argued that a great deal of weight should be given the fact
that Congress even mentioned the "overnight" doctrine, especially
where it was unnecessary to do so.7 1
In a recent case, the Supreme Court has resolved the conflict
by accepting the Commissioner's "sleep or rest" rule, i.e., no de-
duction may be taken unless the necessary traveling expenses were
accompanied by lodging.72  The Court acknowledged that the
"overnight" concept was to a certain extent arbitrary but stated
that any change in the area should be initiated by Congress rather
than the courts. The Supreme Court was concerned that if there
were a rigid rule, the purpose of the travel section, assumedly to
equalize employees who must travel to earn their income with
those employees who can pursue their livelihood near their homes,
would be thwarted, granting the traveling employee a much greater
benefit than was intended. Thus, the Supreme Court denied the
deduction to salesmen who do not travel overnight, the very group
the statute initially intended to aid.7 3
Conclusion
If the courts, the Service, and Congress are to reach a viable
solution in the travel expense area certain factors must be kept in
mind. For one, the purpose of this deduction as it is now viewed
must be emphasized. In Harvey v. Commissioner,7 4 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the purpose of the travel
expense deduction was to remove the inequalities existing between
68Rev. Rul. 63-2391, 1963-2 Cum. BuLL. 87.6946 T.C. 176 (1966), rezd, 374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
70Id. at 181.
71 Id. at 187 (concurring opinion).
72United States v. Correll ....... US ....... (1967).
7361 CoNG. REc. 6673 (1921) (remarks of Senator Walsh).
74283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960).
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the taxpayer who is compelled to travel in order to earn a living
and the taxpayer who is employed in the general vicinity of his
permanent residence. These inequalities are said to arise because
the former taxpayer must incur the cost of living accommodations
while traveling and at the same time maintain a permanent resi-
dence. Thus, any acceptable solution to the "tax home" contro-
versy must have as its goal the equalization of the tax burden borne
by those taxpayers whose occupation requires them to travel with
those whose occupation allows them to remain at home.
Professor Griswold, addressing himself to the deduction of all
"ordinary and necessary" business expenses, has stated that this
section must be given broad application. He emphasized that this
broad application is necessary to achieve the obvious purpose of
Congress, i.e., to tax only net income. He also argued that a
statute should not be construed so as to place the burden of proof
upon the taxpayer.
75
Along the same line is a quote from Helvering v. Rebsamen
Motors, Inc.,70 which is applicable although dealing with a different
tax area. There, the court stated that it
followed a rule that the use by a legislative body of words having
definite meanings creates no ambiguity and that such words are to be
taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense. We
have come to realize that the rule is not always a safe guide to follow
in construing the language of a taxing statute. . . It is our under-
standing, however, that the rule is still to be applied unless it can
clearly be seen that Congress used the words in question in a broader
or different sense than that which would ordinarily be attributed to
them. ... One may honestly and reasonably believe that in drafting a
taxing act Congress uses the language which most nearly expresses the
legislative intent, and that if the language used fails properly to express
that intent, correction should be made by Congressional action and not
by Treasury regulations or by judicial construction. 77
These statements would appear to present a most logical view-
point for not adhering to the strained definitions the Internal Rev-
enue Service has supplied for ordinary terms. "Home" should
therefore be applied in tax cases so as to mean the taxpayer's resi-
dence and not his principal place of business as the Service main-
tains. If there are sufficient reasons for not permitting certain
individuals the travel deduction, such as the unique position of the
serviceman, then this should be expressly pointed out without re-
sorting to unusual interpretations of tax terms.
7 Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should
be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HAIv. L. REv.
1142 (1942).
76 123 F2d 584 (8th Cir. 1942).
7Id. at 587.
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Although the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
disputed the Commissioner's "tax home" concept, at the same time
it has supported the distinction being made between "temporary"
and "indefinite" employment. However, it has disagreed with the
way this exception was being applied by the Tax Court. The ninth
circuit's views were best demonstrated in Harvey v. Commissioner7 s
where taxpayer was employed by an aircraft company in Santa
Monica, California. He was sent by the company to work at an
Air Force base over one-hundred miles from Santa Mvfonica. Al-
though no representations were made to taxpayer regarding the
period of his employment at the base, estimates had been made by
the company of how long the project in which the taxpayer was
involved would last. The estimates ranged from a few months to
two years. Taxpayer did not include the amount received from his
company on a per diem basis for expenses incurred while living at
the Air Force base on his income tax return, considering this
amount to be deductible as "away from home" travel expenses.
The Tax Court 79 held that his employment was "indefinite" and
the amount taxpayer received must be included as income. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in reversing, established a
rule to determine when employment "away from home" is "tem-
porary" as opposed to "indefinite." This rule was that "an em-
ployee might be said to change his tax home if there is a reasonable
probability known to him that he may be employed for a long
period of time at his new station." 80 The circumstances of each
case must be taken into account in order to determine whether a
taxpayer could reasonably have been expected to change his resi-
dence, and, consequently, not be entitled to a travel expense de-
duction.
The ninth circuit's distinction between "temporary" and "in-
definite" employment away from one's residence should be adopted.
Their idea would be to consider travel for business purposes "tem-
porary" when it is not feasible for the taxpayer to relocate his
home. Thus, where, as in Harvey, the taxpayer has adequate
reason to believe that his employment will be of only short duration,
he would not reasonably be expected to move his residence to his
new job site. An approach similar to the reasonable man test
could be used, i.e., where a reasonable man would relocate his
residence, no deduction would be permitted. But where the tax-
payer has acted reasonably in not changing his residence, for ex-
ample, where he is prohibited from having his family accompany
him, then a deduction must be allowed. The two other require-
ments of section 162(a) (2) [(1) that the expenses must be "ordi-
78283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960).
7932 T.C. 1368 (1959).80 Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1960).
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nary and necessary"; and (2) incurred while in the pursuit of a
trade or business] would still have to be satisfied before a deduc-
tion would be allowed, and thus would seem to render unwarranted
the fear that defining "home" as residence would create a complete
change in the tax structure.
These requirements could also be used as a deterrent to any
abuse in the "away from home overnight" area. "Away from
home" should also not be given an unwarranted unique interpreta-
tion. The Supreme Court's acceptance of the Commissioner's
artificial definitions sacrifices fairness for an easily-enforceable
but arbitrary rule.
